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Abstract In 1996, the Royal College of Psychiatrists recommended that all psy-
chiatric facilities in the UK develop policies concerning sexuality and sexual
expression for persons contained in those facilities. This paper analyses the prev-
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the College recommends an individualised approach to sexual and emotional rela-
tionships, most hospitals in fact either prohibit or actively discourage such
expression as a matter of policy. The paper considers the advantages and disad-
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these policies, and in particular the legal authority for governing the sexual and
emotional expression of hospital residents and the relevant human rights
implications.
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Introduction
The sexual behaviour of psychiatric inpatients has historically been ignored, both by
hospital policies and by the academic literature (Buckley and Wiechers 1999; Civic
et al. 1993; Dobal and Torkelson 2004). This exclusion originated from a social
climate in which sexual activity was a taboo subject (Krumm et al. 2004) and has
been perpetuated by the assumption that people with major mental illnesses are
asexual (Buckley and Robben 2000; Buckley and Wiechers 1999; McCann 2000).
Consequently little attention has been paid to the sexual needs of psychiatric
patients (McCann 2000) and sexual activity is commonly banned in psychiatric
institutions, despite the inherent role of sexuality in quality of life (Binder 1985;
Dobal and Torkelson 2004; Welch and Clements 1996). The advent of AIDS and
HIV in the 1980s forced psychiatrists to look at sexual behaviour more closely and
to consider the need for policy guidelines in psychiatric institutions (Chase 1988;
McCann 2000; Mossman et al. 1997).
It is now widely recognised that individuals with major mental disorders are
sexually active, even in psychiatric institutions where sexual interactions are
expressly forbidden (Buckley and Robben 2000; Buckley et al. 1999). Whilst there
is evidence to suggest that clinical nursing staff often view inpatients’ sexual
activity as problematic (Cole et al. 2003; Dobal and Torkelson 2004; Keitner et al.
1986), less is known about hospital policies and management of sexual behaviour in
the UK. Ideally, staff responses should be consistent and guided by clear
administrative policy (Buckley and Robben 2000); the absence of clear policy
increases the probability that staff will be guided by their own moral judgements
and personal beliefs, and hence act inconsistently as a group (Buckley and Wiechers
1999; Mossman et al. 1997).
In recent years there have been movements in professional circles to engage with
issues of sexuality among psychiatric inpatients. In 1996 The Royal College of
Psychiatrists produced a report; Sexual Abuse and Harassment in Psychiatric
Settings, subsequently revised in 2007 as Sexual Boundary Issues in Psychiatric
Settings. One of the recommendations arising out of the earlier document was
‘‘Each unit should have a clear written policy which covers acceptable, consenting
activity and issues such as harassment and sexual abuse. The policy should ensure
that sexuality and sexual issues are considered as part of individual care plans’’
(Royal College of Psychiatrists 1996, p2; 2007, p4). Notably this encourages both
general policies and individuation within a clinical paradigm; albeit a policy can be
written in terms of either (non) acceptable behaviour or of an approach to deciding
clinically what is acceptable for the individual. At a similar time, the Royal College
of Nursing issued guidance concerning the sexual health needs of psychiatric
service users (Royal College of Nursing 1996).
Notwithstanding these developments, there has been little research to determine
how issues of sexuality and relationships are actually dealt with in psychiatric
facilities. This paper considers the policies developed in English and Welsh forensic
facilities, with particular attention to legal and law-related policy issues. What
emerges is a peculiarly confused and contradictory landscape, not merely between
policies but within individual policies themselves.
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The Current Approach
This paper is based on a study undertaken in 2006. The original study design was
exploratory in nature, aimed at investigating the current policies and practices
surrounding sexual relationships employed by practitioners working in forensic
facilities in England and Wales. The study adopted a mixed-method to collect data:
a survey, which included both closed and open-ended questions on sexual
relationship policies and practices, and textual data, derived from the policy
documents. In order to secure participation a covering letter explaining the study
was sent to the Medical Director of every unit, together with the survey
questionnaire. This letter specifically asked the recipient to complete the enclosed
questionnaire and return it together with a copy of their written policies on sexual
relationships with the SAE provided. 60 forensic services from high, medium and
low secure were approached. Reminders were sent out at 7 months and at
10 months. A number of unresponsive units were contacted by telephone on a
number of occasions where copies of the survey questionnaire were sent again via
fax. The last policy document was received as late as the end of 2009. The ethical
standard observed in this study prevents us from disclosing the names of the
forensic units participating in this study. The data from the questionnaires was
analysed for descriptive statistics, while the textual data from the written policies
was analysed thematically and comparatively across security levels.
Whilst a detailed statistical analysis of the survey data will be published
elsewhere (in progress), this paper is primarily based on an analysis of the policy
documents on sexual relationships, which we think will be of relevance to lawyers,
clinicians and policymakers specifically in relation to human rights. The response
rate from various forensic services can be gauged from Table 1, which illustrates
both the response rate for the survey and the policies we requested. This table shows
a 65% return rate for questionnaires (No. 39 out of 60), highlighting also the total
number of policies received by type of service. Of those responding, 17 hospital
units had a written policy (43% of 39 responses), whilst 13 had an overall unwritten
approach (33%), and eight had a patient-centred approach presumably of the sort
envisaged by the Royal College in its 1996 report (20%). One service did not
indicate the type of policy they had in place. The questionnaire also asked how
policy was implemented. All three high-security hospitals stated that they rely only
on written policy on sexual relationships, where 14 of the 26 medium-security
hospitals relied primarily on non-written policies, albeit buttressed by written policy
in 12 cases. Similarly, low-security hospitals principally adopt a non-written policy
to manage sexual relationships: seven used unwritten, and two written policies.
Table 1 Summary of response rate per type of unit
Unit type Questionnaires sent out Questionnaires received Policies received
High secure 3 3 3
Medium secure 45 26 10
Low secure 12 10 1
Total and response rates (%) 60 39 (65%) 14
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Table 2 provides an overview of the main components of the polices on inpatient
relationships highlighting variations amongst the three types of forensic hospitals
regarding their approach to such policy in their services.
This overview has its limitations. Factors appear only if they are contained in the
specific policy the authors were sent. It is difficult to believe that all three high
secure facilities do not have a policy on pornography, for example, or who may
enter service users’ bedrooms and under what circumstances; but such policies are
invisible in the overview because they do not appear in the policy related to
sexuality and relationships. Further, if the concern is about the people in the
institutions, the policy itself may well be less significant than its implementation (or
non-implementation). The policies often place considerable discretion in the hands
of the multi-disciplinary teams or clinical staff in charge of the service user’s care as
to whether emotional relationships are permitted to develop. For the service users,
the exercise of that discretion will be pivotal, and that is not contained in the current
data.
Emerging Discursive Tensions
Comparison of Policies
It is clear from the overview that there are inconsistencies across institutions as to
what is permitted and what not. Thus in one high secure facility, service users may
obtain condoms with the approval of their responsible clinician; in another,
condoms are expressly considered to be contraband and are to be confiscated if
found. Particularly at the medium and low-secure levels, attitudes to sexual or
emotional expression vary radically. In at least one medium secure facility, the
possibility of conjugal visits is not ruled out, when the multi-disciplinary team
consider them appropriate; in others, visits must occur only in public parts of the
facility, and strict behavioural restrictions are imposed. In some, physical
expressions of affection such as hugging and kissing are expressly permitted; in
others, even holding hands is prohibited.
The policies show the extraordinarily controlled nature of institutional life.
Certainly, it is reasonable that institutions have sensible rules regarding communal
living, to protect the reasonable expectations of all, and 11 of the 15 written policies
the authors received contain provisions to this effect. Thus in institutions where
pornography is permitted, it is restricted to the service user’s bedroom, and six
policies expressly note that masturbation was acceptable if and only if it occurred in
the privacy of the service user’s bedroom. Some policies also provided examples of
what constituted acceptable behaviour, with six policies noting that kissing, hugging
or cuddling was acceptable in more public environments in the facility. These
provisions can be understood as reflecting a broader social consensus as to what
conduct is appropriate in a public environment.
Some policies however move well beyond issues of what is required for
standards of decency in communal living. One institution for adolescents banned
virtually all physical contact between service users: even holding hands was not
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Table 2 Summary of main components of policies on inpatients’ relationships
HS
[n = 3]
MS
[n = 6]
MS/LS
[n = 2]
LS
[n = 4]
Policy document size
15 pages or more 3 – – –
5–7 pages – 1 – 2
2–4 pages – 5 2 2
Overall direction
Sexual intercourse prohibited 3 3 – 1
Sexual relationships to be actively discouraged – 1 2 3
Sexual relationships expressly permitted, if appropriate – 2 1a –
Other behavioural limitations
Express restrictions on inappropriate behaviour other than
sexual intercourse (see next row)
3 5 1 2
Definitions/illustrations of what constitute ‘inappropriate’
behaviour is provided
3 4 – 1
Dress code – 3 – –
Limitations on access to service users’ bedrooms – 3 – –
Policy expressly affecting user/visitor relationships 3 3 – –
Response to sexual/affectionate behaviour
General statement that sexual/affectionate behaviour normal 3 4 1 4
Express concerns with exploitation and sexual abuse of service
users
3 6 2 4
Express acknowledgement that notwithstanding restrictive
policy, sexual behaviour will occur
1 2 – 2
Considers pregnancy outcome 2 – – –
Pornography to be available, subject to controls – – – 2
Pornography contraband, subject to individual exceptions – – – 1
Contraception/condoms available 1 5 1 4
Condoms contraband 1 – – –
Relationship counselling/sexual education available 3 6 2 4
Confidentiality/breach of confidentiality policy 2 2 2 –
Issues of capacity of participants expressly a factor for
assessment
1 5 – 3
Expressly stated that policy applies equally to heterosexual and
homosexual relationships
2 3 1 3
Right to marry expressly affirmed 3 2 – –
Staff issues
Service user to have intimate care provided by same-sex
member of staff
1 3 1 2
Staff training to be provided on matters related to sexuality/
relationships
– 1 1 2
Staff-service user relationships expressly prohibited 3 5 – –
a N = 3 because one policy appears both actively to discourage and to allow such relationships
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permitted. In another, any significant physical contact such as holding hands or
kissing, while sometimes acceptable, would trigger investigation and potential
intervention of the multi-disciplinary team. This points to a pervasive theme in the
policies, that sexual and emotional relationships are appropriately the focus of
management by professionals. Even in those facilities where sexual expression was
not ruled out completely, the relationship had to be scrutinised by the care team(s)
of the service user(s). Occasionally, attempts were made to introduce consistent
values to professional decision-making in this regard. Thus nine of the policies
expressly stated that they apply equally to gay and straight relationships. Three
policies made it clear that while staff had the right to their own ethical views
regarding sex and relationships, they could not enforce those views onto service
users, although two others noted the right of staff not to witness activity they find
indecent. Overall, the policies leave extraordinary discretion to the multi-
disciplinary teams as to whether to allow the relationship to continue, even if it is
an emotional relationship that complies with a ‘no sex’ rule. This authority of the
multi-disciplinary teams is reflected not merely in the written policies analysed
below, but also in the survey responses concerning unwritten policies. This assumes
that sex and emotional relationships are clinical matters subject to regulation, as
with other aspects of freedom.
Capacity to Consent
Outside the context of psychiatric facilities, such controls are permitted when an
individual lacks capacity. In that event, as discussed elsewhere in this special
edition, the individual cannot consent to sexual relations, and such relationships
become illegal: see Sexual Offences Act 2005, s 30–45; Mental Capacity Act 2005,
s 27(1). For nonsexual aspects of relationships, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 will
apply, and decisions must be made according to a statutory test of best interests,
requiring inter alia consideration of the current and past views of the person lacking
capacity, and consultation with careers who would be aware of the persons wishes
and beliefs before he or she lost capacity. The criteria under the best interests test of
the MCA are not exhaustive, and objective best interests also come into the picture.
As such it is not a pure substitute judgment test, but it is has elements of that
approach.
Eight of the policies reviewed in this study identify capacity as a matter which
must be taken into account, although several other policies note the need for
consent, which may import a capacity assessment by implication. Often, the
references to consent are however minimal or tangential. Two policies refer to the
need to follow the Mental Capacity Act 2005, providing little indication of what that
would mean in the context of relationships. In only two policies, identical in this
point in their substance, is any reference made to what might need to be understood
for a determination of capacity to be made—‘ability to comprehend and retain the
necessary material to make a decision about a relationship, including the potential
consequences of the relationship.’ While inevitably this lacks the nuance of some of
the case law, it is a reasonable provision. Otherwise, guidance for capacity
determination is not contained in the policies. Similarly, the appropriate approach
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for determining whether a non-sexual relationship should be permitted to develop is
not discussed in any significant way, leaving clinicians essentially with a ‘free hand’
as to how to approach these relationship [s and activities. Insofar as the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 does indeed apply (as it would, for example, for an informal
patient admitted outside the forensic context), the continuance of a non-sexual
relationship would be determined according to the best interest test in that statute,
with its express criteria and processes noted above. These are nowhere referred to in
the policies, leaving a potential implication that the continuance of the relationship
is a matter for the unbounded discretion of the service user’s care team.
None of the policies make a clear distinction between sexual and non-sexual
relationships as regards mental capacity, notwithstanding that the former are illegal
when an individual lacks capacity and the latter not necessarily illegal. Analysing
this failure is complex, as in six of the eight policies sexual activity is either
prohibited or actively discouraged in any event: arguably, if sex is not permitted
anyway, issues of capacity are superfluous. As noted above, however, even in these
facilities the attitude to sexual expression is perhaps sometimes more ambiguous
than the policy suggests. It is fair to wonder if this ambiguity is carried over into the
situation where one of the participants lacks capacity to consent to the activity, and
if so, whether sexual relationships are also occasionally considered under some form
of best interests approach. Insofar as this is the case, the discussion here intersects
with discussion elsewhere in this volume as to whether capacity is necessarily the
appropriate approach to the legality of sexual activity. Whatever the ethics of that
discussion, of course, the law on the matter is clear: both parties must give
capacitous consent for sexual activity to be legal.
Conflicting Roles and Legal Expectations Within Individual Policies
If we move outside the realm of capacity, the policies are best understood in the
context of the conflicting roles and legal expectations of forensic hospitals, under
the umbrella of mental health legislation. The overview in Table 2, highlighting the
diversity of approach between institutional settings, is not sensitive enough to
clearly illustrate the contradictions within the individual policies themselves.
Sometimes, these tensions are overt, as in the following opening paragraphs of one
of the policies:
1.1 Sexuality is a fundamental aspect of the human condition and as such cannot
be ignored or dismissed. This policy outlines the attitude at [institution name]
towards patients’ sexuality and offers guidelines for staff.
1.2 The management of [institution name] actively discourages sexual relation-
ships between patients. As part of the assessment process staff should be aware
of patients’ views on sexuality, sexual orientation and facilitate open dialogue
with patients on issues of sexuality.
Eleven of the policies, including nine of the thirteen where sexual congress is
prohibited or actively discouraged, contain an explicit statement such as the one in
the first paragraph of the quotation, acknowledging that sexuality is part of what it is
to be human. This suggests a positive aspect to such relationships, that is
You May Kiss the Bride 161
123
immediately countered by the prohibition or discouragement of a service user
engaging in such relationships. This tension continues in the second sentence of
paragraph 1.2: the service user’s views on sexuality are to be actively explored in
discussion, but as the first sentence of the paragraph makes clear, must not be acted
upon.
Other tensions are less overt. Thus even in the thirteen policies where sexual
activity is prohibited or discouraged, nine allow for the provision of birth control or
condoms, and all provide for sexual education and/or relationship counselling.
These provisions might reasonably be taken to be sending positive messages to
service users about sexual or emotional relationships, which they are then to be
discouraged from pursuing. Some aspects of these policies, such as the availability
of birth control or contraception, might reflect the fact that sex may occur
notwithstanding an official line discouraging or prohibiting it—a fact acknowledged
expressly by nine of the thirteen policies—but if so, the ramifications do not appear
to have been thought through. Thus, of the ten policies allowing for the provision of
birth control or condoms, none provide an express right of confidentiality for the
service user as regards the clinical team, and six expressly involve the clinical team
in the provision of these services. The service user is thus required to identify
himself or herself as breaking the sexual prohibition in order to get the birth control
or condoms, to the people in charge of enforcing that prohibition. It is difficult to see
that this is workable.
These tensions may be the result of the persistence of older anxieties about
uncontrolled desire that permeate also other policies regulating sexual relationships
of the young and young homosexuals.
The Right to Wed
The inclusion of the right to marry in five of the policies raises a slightly different
question: what exactly does it mean, when one of the parties is subject to detention
in a forensic psychiatric facilities? The criteria for capacity to marry might be
expected to provide a possible guide. As discussed elsewhere in this special edition
(Hasson, 2010), these tests conceive of marriage as paradigmatically a social and
sexual union. Sheffield County Council v E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam) makes the
first of these connections:
Marriage, whether civil or religious, is a contract, formally entered into. It
confers on the parties the status of husband and wife, the essence of the
contract being an agreement between a man and a woman to live together, and
to love one another as husband and wife, to the exclusion of all others. It
creates a relationship of mutual and reciprocal obligations, typically involving
the sharing of a common home and a common domestic life and the right to
enjoy each other’s society, comfort and assistance. [para 132]
X City Council v MB, NB and MAB [2006] EWHC 168 (Fam), extends this
definition by acknowledging that a sexual relationship is usually implicit in
marriage. While these may only be indicative criteria, it is notable that marriage
with a person on long stay in a high secure psychiatric facility will import none of
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these characteristics, as the policies state that a married partner is subject to the
same restrictions on behaviour as any other visitor to an institution. All of the high
secure facilities expressly prohibit sexual activity. Cohabitation between the
married partners will be impossible, as will participation in a common domestic life
and the enjoyment of each other’s society. Even during visits, expressions of
meaningful affection are strictly limited, including in one case the prohibition of
open-mouthed kissing (hence the title of this article). In some cases, policies require
constant supervision of the individuals by a member of staff throughout the visit,
allowing no privacy and in practice no doubt discouraging intimacy. All three of
these facilities specifically acknowledge the right to marry; but in what sense, one
might ask, is the relationship on offer a marriage?
The right to marry may well have been included in the policies because of its
inclusion in Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). To
date, the issue of what constitutes a marriage under that article has received minimal
discussion. In UK v Hamer (no. 7114/75, Commission report of 13 December 1979),
a case concerning the right of prisoners to marry, the European Commission1
referred to marriage as ‘the formation of a legally binding association between a
man and a woman’, and this has been cited by the European Court of Human Rights
without criticism: see e.g., Frasik v Poland, (no. 22933/02, decision of 5 January
2010, para 83). By this minimal standard, the marriages provided under the policies
comply. At the same time, Hamer also referred to the potentially ‘stabilizing and
rehabilitative influence’ of marriage (para 72). It is difficult to see that such effects
are likely to occur as effectively as they might, unless some of the substantive
benefits of marriage precluded by the policies are somehow introduced into the
relationship.
The policies form an inconsistent and somewhat incoherent landscape, both as
between institutions and indeed within policies themselves. The remainder of this
paper will look at some of the legal and socio-legal issues that flow from these
incoherencies.
The Authority to Regulate
Many of the policies do appear on their face to be extraordinarily intrusive into what
would normally be considered private situations. They generally do not purport
merely to control sexual relationships, but emotional relationships as well. They
allow for minute controls on what service users can and cannot do: whether hand-
holding or open-mouth kissing will be permitted will depend on the facility to which
one is admitted, for example.
To justify such intrusive rules, one would reasonably expect a clear legal rule-
making authority, based in statute and, perhaps, secondary legislation. Such an
authority exists for prisons, where the Prison Act 1952 provides a legal framework
1 Until 1998, the European Commission of Human Rights was a gateway body to the European Court of
Human Rights, providing an initial view to the Court. As such, its opinions are relevant for interpreting
the ECHR, but not as convincing as those of the Court itself.
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for regulation, buttressed by a power under s 47(1) on the Secretary of State to make
additional rules ‘for the regulation and management of prisons, remand centres,
detention centres and youth custody centres, respectively, had for the classification,
treatment, employment, discipline and control of persons required to be detained
therein.’ This section provides the statutory authority for the Prison Rules 1999 (SI
1999, No 728, as amended). These are in turn overlaid by a body of international
law, most notably the European Prison Rules (Council of Europe Rec (2006) 2; see
also Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009). In the prison context, such rule-making thus
has a clear legal authority and contextual basis.
Such a structure is conspicuously absent in the context of psychiatric facilities.
For the three high secure facilities, some regulatory authority is created by the
Safety and Security in Ashworth, Broadmoor and Rampton Hospital Directions
2000 issued by the Secretary of State.2 The main thrust of these directions is the
regulation of searches in the high secure facilities, although they also contain rules
regarding locking up of service users at night, access to the outdoors, access to (and
interception of) telephone calls, and the requirement to perform risk assessments.
While the content of these directions may of course indirectly affect the pursuit of
emotional relationships by service users (as, for example, by the restriction of
telephone calls except to pre-programmed numbers approved by the institution), the
directions do not expressly refer to the governance of sexual or emotional
relationships.
Outside the high secure facilities, even this minimal framework is absent. The
case law to establish an authority for governance rules in institutions has taken two
paths. One flows from the case of Pountney v Griffiths [1976] AC 314 (HL). In that
case, it was alleged that a nurse at Broadmoor Hospital struck a service user who
was not returning to the wards quickly enough following visiting hours. The nurse
was convicted by the Bracknell magistrates of common assault, but the leave of a
High Court Judge had not been sought prior to the commencement of the
prosecution, as was required by s 141 of the Mental Health Act 1959 (now s 139 of
the Mental Health Act 1983). Such leave would be required if the blow struck was
‘an act purporting to be done’ in pursuance of the Mental Health Act. The House of
Lords held that the blow was covered by these words, and thus leave was required.
Forensic detentions were made when the individual had a mental disorder
warranting detention for medical treatment, and ‘that necessarily involves the
exercise of control and discipline. (Pountney at 335) By R v Broadmoor Special
Hospital Authority and Secretary of State for Health (1998 WL 1044171, CA), and
notwithstanding the absence of any express rule-making authority under the Mental
Health Act 1983, this had expanded into a general power of control:
[The Mental Health Acts 1959 and 1983] leave unspoken many of the
necessary incidents of control flowing from a power of detention for treatment,
including: the power to restrain patients, to keep them in seclusion…, to
2 These directions were issued originally pursuant to s 17 of the National Health Service Act 1977 as
amended and s 4(5) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The power in s 17 of the 1977
Act has now been replaced by s 8 of the National Health Service Act 2006.
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deprive them of their personal possessions for their own safety and to regulate
the frequency and manner and manner of visits to them….
While this approach may make some sense for necessary corollaries to the fact of
detention, it is difficult to see that it is defensible for rules of governance not directly
related to detention, into which category the policies on sexual and emotional
expression arguably fall, at least in some of their aspects. While not directly relevant
to the forensic patients covered by the policies in the current study, it is also difficult
to see that it can apply to policies governing informal patients. Is it really the court’s
intention that policies regarding personal possessions or the wearing of sexually
provocative clothing will be different for formal and informal patients? Institutions
must have some of these powers, quite apart from the legal status of their residents.
Thus there must be an authority somewhere to set meal times and visiting hours or,
more relevant to this paper, ensure appropriate standards of decency on hospital
wards, whatever the legal status of the patients.
The second approach flows from property law. R (N) v Secretary of State for
Health [2009] EWCA Civ 795 concerned the legality of a policy by Rampton
Hospital to ban smoking. In that case the majority of the court noted the view
expressed in Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10 at 36 that ‘The public authority
owner or landlord has, broadly speaking, a right to manage and control its property
within bounds set by statute’. Following this approach, the court in N held:
There can be no issue but that the policy is in accordance with the law. When
it was introduced there was no statute or other legal instrument or principle
preventing the Trust from banning smoking. The Trust owns and operates
Rampton (and other hospitals in its area) and, subject to duties owed to
patients or staff, it can set the rules for the operation of the site. [61]
This would suggest that, subject to general law and most significantly the Human
Rights Act 1998,3 any institution can set up pretty much any set of rules it wants.
While this makes more sense of the mundane rules such as the setting of visiting
hours, it has its problems in other contexts. Kay was a housing case, where at least in
theory the relationship was contractual or quasi-contractual: if the tenants did not
like the landlord’s rules, they could leave. This is not the case for people detained
under forensic sections or civil sections in psychiatric facilities. The result under
this theory of authority is a marked disproportion of power in setting institutional
rules. This is appropriately a matter of serious concern when significant intrusions
into the lives of individuals are at issue.
While this approach certainly allows security issues to be taken into account, it is
more flexible than the Pountney approach in taking into account other factors or
priorities. It is easier under this theory to include broad issues of service user health
and psychological well-being, for example. N itself identifies these as specific
priorities:
3 Private psychiatric facilities that contain detained patients are nonetheless considered to be exercising
functions of a public nature, and are therefore within the scope of the Human Rights Act 1998: see R (A) v
Partnerships in Care Ltd. [2002] EWHC 539.
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The Trust exists to deliver health care to its patients in Rampton in a secure
and clinically appropriate environment. It owes a duty of care to them which
covers both their physical and their psychological health and which includes a
duty to take reasonable steps to prevent patients from causing themselves self
harm. (para 62)
Such factors could be introduced to some degree in the Pountney approach—the
patients are, after all, admitted for treatment—but the case may be harder to make in
specific instances. N itself provides a good example: the ban on smoking would be
difficult to justify as a necessary corollary to the detention powers, given that
smoking had been permitted without compromising security or mental health
treatment for time immemorial. Under the approach adopted in N, that issue was not
relevant.
A third approach is also possible, based on common law rights and duties
contained elsewhere in law. There is for example an obligation to ensure the
reasonable safety of people an institution has in its care: see, e.g., Savage v South
Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, Keenan v United
Kingdom (ECHR, application no. 27229/95, judgment of 3 April 2001), D v South
Tyneside Health Care NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 878, Drake v Pontefract
Health Authority [1998] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 425. This obligation is reflected in a
right to restrain individuals to prevent harm or a breach of the peace (R (Munjaz) v
Mersey Care NHS Trust [2003] EWCA 1036; R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of
Gloucestershire Constabulary [2006] UKHL 55). The Mental Capacity Act 2005
allows interventions to be made in the best interests of persons lacking capacity,
subject to procedures contained in that act. While certainly not all persons in
psychiatric facilities will lack capacity for all decisions, this Act does provide a
framework for intervention in cases where capacity for a decision is lacking. While
the justification for each of these rights and duties is individually stronger than the
theories adopted by the court to date, they are limited in their scope, and do not
necessarily form a coherent or sufficiently extensive package to be practicable.
Traditionally, there was little scope for challenge of institutional rules. R v Home
Secretary, ex p Leech [1993] 3 WLR 1125 (CA) did provide some potential. That
case involved searches of correspondence between a prisoner and his lawyer. The
court held that such correspondence was a common law right that could only be
removed if such removal was contemplated either expressly or by necessary
implication in statute, and the necessary implication would be imputed only if an
objective need for the rule could be demonstrated. Absent such necessary
implication, broadly permissive rule-making authority, even if contained in statute,
could not allow the creation of rules that curtailed fundamental rights. In that case,
the relevant statutory instrument was struck down as ultra vires. Insofar as they
remove or limit fundamental rights, the policies of psychiatric institutions ought in
theory to be more vulnerable, as they are supported by no express rule-making
authority. Nonetheless, the case was interpreted remarkably narrowly. For example,
in R v Broadmoor Special Hospital and Health Secretary [1998] WL 1044171 (CA),
the court allowed a policy of random searches in a high secure facility on the basis
that there a sufficiently self-evident and pressing need for the power had been shown
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based on the detention powers of the Mental Health Act 1983, notwithstanding that
this statute has no express rule-making power at all.
The traditional position was nonetheless extremely restricted. The introduction of
the Human Rights Act 1998 created a new mechanism to challenge based on the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is clear that institutions
containing detained patients are covered by the Human Rights Act, whether they are
owned publicly or privately (R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd. [2002] EWHC 539).
The specifics of HRA challenges will be discussed as they arise, but two general
points should be noted here.
First, a number of ECHR articles (most significantly for current purposes article
8) allow restriction of the relevant ECHR right, when necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economy or well-
being of the country, for the prevention of crime or disorder, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. The
interference in question must also, however, be ‘in accordance with the law’.
It would appear that rules embodied only as orders or directions do not come within
this phrase: Silver v the United Kingdom (No. 5947/72, judgment 25 February 1983,
(1983) 5 EHRR 347) para 89. The rules in Silver were formal directives issued by
the minister, analogous to the Safety and Security Directions for the high secure
hospitals, noted above. It is difficult to imagine that the policies at issue in this paper
would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement. They are institutional policies, based
either in an implied authority in the Mental Health Act 1983, or in the rights of a
landlord to control his or her premises. It is difficult to see that this is sufficiently
robust law to satisfy article 8(2) and similar provisions.
Second, the ECHR issues raise two related but separate questions. The first is
whether the policy itself is consistent with the ECHR; the second is even if
the policy is consistent with the ECHR, whether the effect of the policy on the
individual breaches the ECHR. It is clear that if a policy is alleged to breach the
ECHR, judicial review of that policy may be taken: see, e.g., R (RH) v Ashworth
Hospital Authority [2001] EWHC Admin 972 regarding the provision of condoms in
Ashworth Hospital, and R (N) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] EWCA Civ 795
regarding the prohibition of smoking at Rampton Hospital.
It also seems, however, that an individual may allege that the application of a
policy to himself or herself gives rise to an ECHR violation, even when it is not
alleged that the policy itself is in violation of the ECHR. Thus a service user was
permitted to challenge a plan of medication that was to be imposed under the Mental
Health Act 1983, without challenging the acceptability of the law under which it
was being imposed: see R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authorities
[2001] EWCA Civ 1545. The thrust of the argument, reasonably enough, would
appear to be that when an ECHR violation is alleged, some judicial or quasi-judicial
body must be in a position to determine the merits of the case. If this is the case for
compulsory treatment, there is no obvious reason that an analogous argument would
not apply for other alleged ECHR violations.
This is potentially of particular relevance to those aspects of policies that apply
across the board in facilities. If the application of such a policy to an individual
raises ECHR issues regarding that individual, he or she may press that individual
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violation. By way of example, consider Dickson v the United Kingdom (No 44362/
04, judgment of 4 December 2007), where a prisoner and his wife wished to start a
family. Conjugal visits were not permitted in the prison, and the time remaining on
Dickson’s sentence was such that by his release date, his wife would be likely to be
beyond child-bearing years. The Secretary of State had refused to permit artificial
insemination, and Dickson challenged this refusal, based on article 8 (right to family
life) and 12 (right to found a family) of the ECHR. The European Court of Human
Rights upheld his challenge, on the basis that the Secretary of State had not given
adequate weight to the interests of those involved. The same result would
presumably apply to a similar factual situation in a psychiatric context.
Towards Coherent Policy?
Whether or not the makers of the policies considered in this paper looked to the
legal authority for regulation prior to creating their policies, the policies reflect the
some of the themes and ambiguities of those theories of authority. Analysis of some
of the themes that cut across both the policies and these justifications for regulatory
authority may provide some potential to develop a more coherent approach.
Issues of Protection and Safety
All the written policies consulted in this study contained provisions reflecting
concern for the safety of service users, and emphasising the need to protect them
from exploitation. This is one of only two categories in Table 2 that is present in
every policy.
This is perhaps unsurprising, as it lies at the intersection of a variety of
administrative themes. Certainly, law is concerned about the safety of service users.
Psychiatric institutions have a duty of care over service users in their care, and the
failure adequately to protect inpatients is one of the few areas where courts have
been prepared to find against health care professionals and mental health trusts in
civil cases (see cases cited above).
Safety is further a part of the political agenda regarding mental health services.
The Safety and Security Directions for the high secure facilities, introduced in 2000,
can be seen as a manifestation of this priority, and the increasingly intensive
surveillance that it entails. Indeed, the perception in the field was that much of the
impetus surrounding mental health law reform over the decade 1998–2007 was
based on a desire better to protect the public and, less obviously, service users.
Dangerousness has long been a part of the concern in English mental health
legislation (see Bartlett and Sandland 2007, 120–1), and in a world that is meant to
be increasingly risk-obsessed (Beck 1992), it is unsurprising that safety concerns are
part of the political policy agenda.
Issues of patient safety were also key to the approach of the Royal College, which
entitled its 1996 report on sexual issues Sexual Abuse and Harassment in
Psychiatric Settings (Royal College of Psychiatrists 1996). While the title was
changed to the more rounded Boundary Disputes for the second edition in 2007,
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the original concern was clear: this was about protecting patients. Sometimes, at the
institutional level, this apparently flows from particular incidents. Thus for example
in 1990, at a time when Ashworth Hospital was apparently less firm in its
enforcement of a no sex policy, a homicide resulted in a period when two patients
were left unsupervised. This apparently continued to affect the administration’s
prohibition of sexual behaviour between patients more than 10 years later: see R
(RH) v Ashworth Hospital Authority [2001] EWHC Admin 872, para 18.
RH is a peculiar case, in that it is ostensibly about a challenge to the refusal of
Ashworth Hospital to provide condoms to patients who wish to be sexually active,
in violation of the no sex rule. That said, a considerable part of the case is spent
analysing the justification for the no sex policy itself, presumably on the basis that if
that policy could not stand, the no condoms policy would also not be defensible; and
a key aspect of the finding that the policy is justified relates to issues of risk. On this
point, the court is not particularly convincing. It notes that the high incidence of
sexual offending in the patient population:
A high proportion of patients have previously committed offences of a sexual
nature (some 266 offences altogether). Dr James (the medical director) states
that there are 138 convictions of a sexual nature attributable to a total of 101
male patients suffering from personality disorder, and 128 such offences
attributable to a total of 259 male patients suffering from other mental illness
or impairment, in both cases including the unrestricted patients among those
totals. There is thus, broadly speaking, 1.3 convictions for a sexual offence for
every one male patient suffering from a personality disorder, and 1 such
conviction for every two male patients suffering from other mental illness.
[para 15]
Sadly, this is statistical nonsense. Even assuming that all the offences were of
sufficient severity that they would raise concerns as to whether the perpetrator
should be sexually active in the future, one cannot average out numbers across
populations this way. Assume (admittedly rather improbably) that all 138 of the
offences by the personality disordered offenders were committed by the same
person. The average offences per person on that ward would remain unchanged, but
100 of the 101 patients would have no record of sexual offences. In that event, it
would be difficult to argue that a blanket prohibition of sexual activity was justified
by the statistic. What might well be relevant is not the average number of sexual
offences, but the number of people with at least one conviction for a serious sexual
offence. Sadly, that statistic was not provided in the judgment. It may be that the
nature of the service users at Ashworth is such that sexual conduct can reasonably
be prohibited; but the statistics above are not an argument to that effect.
In the remainder of the judgment, the court does not look behind the evidence of
the Ashworth staff, and Dr James in particular. It accepts the vulnerability of
Ashworth patients, and the significant risk that they will be subject to abusive
relationships. It accepts that this risk can be effectively managed in high secure
psychiatric facilities, unlike in prisons, and it accepts that virtually no sexual
activity occurred in Ashworth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence of the
applicant and the contrary acknowledgement in its policy itself (quoted at para 4.3
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of the judgment). The court therefore accepts the view of the Ashworth staff that
risk of sexual offending and sexual abuse could be appropriately managed by the
prohibition of sexual conduct.
Whether the nature of the service user populations warrants a blanket no sex
policy at the high secure facilities is a moot point. Certainly, the reasoning in RH is
not unproblematic. In any event, several points should be made.
First, whatever its strengths and weaknesses, the case does not stand as a
precedent that a blanket no sex policy is justified outside the high secure realm.
As patient populations are less ill and less dangerous, as they will be likely to be in
less secure environments, the logic of the RH case becomes harder to sustain. This is
not to say that vulnerability and abuse cease to be issues. Significant numbers of
service users feel unsafe on hospital wards. In the 2009 Survey by the Care Quality
Commission, only 45% of psychiatric inpatients felt always safe on acute wards,
and 16% responded that they did not feel safe on these wards even sometimes (Care
Quality Commission 2009, q6). In Mind’s Ward Watch survey of 2004, 18% of
inpatients reported experiences of sexual harassment (Mind 2004). Patients do have
a reasonable expectation that they will feel safe on wards, and it is appropriate for
the hospital administration to make reasonable efforts to ensure that this is the case.
It does not necessarily follow from this that blanket no sex policies, and the
intrusive emotional relationship policies will be justified; but it is equally true that
the safety-related issues must be considered with care.
Second, while a no sex policy may reduce the frequency of sexual activity, it will
not eliminate it. This is acknowledged in five of the thirteen written policies in
which sexual behaviour is either forbidden or actively discouraged, and is consistent
with the evidence of the applicant in the RH case. It is also consistent with the
findings of Hales et al. (2006), who found that 15 of the 25 service users interviewed
in English high secure hospitals had been in or were currently having a relationship,
and four reporting intimacy involving genital contact. The prohibition strategy
places any congress that does occur outside any risk control. This is most easily seen
regarding risks of venereal disease. A no sex rule means that it is unlikely that
people who intend to be sexually active will request condoms, even in institutions
where they are at least in theory available. To do so means identifying oneself as a
person who is intending on breaking the ‘no sex’ rule, and the suspicion is bound to
be that such an identification will result in closer surveillance, and correspondingly
fewer opportunities to engage in the sexual activity. The failure to request the
condoms, however, will place the individual and his or her partner at greater risk of
venereal disease and, if the relationship is heterosexual, pregnancy. Because of the
enforced movement of the sexual activity ‘underground’, it is placed outside any
risk management. While this is the clearest example, a similar argument applies
regarding emotionally dependant relationships involving vulnerable people. If the
parties understand that they must keep the relationship secret, any vulnerabilities in
a weaker partner may be preyed on by an abusive partner until the relationship is
discovered. The relationship will not be discussed with the clinical staff because it is
required to be secret; and the failure to discuss it with the clinical staff means that
the more vulnerable party will not receive relevant support during the period of
secrecy. The ‘no sex’ policy thus carries risks of its own.
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Third, it is interesting to note the divergence of the discourse of dangerousness
within the hospital setting to that outside the hospital field. As noted above and
elsewhere in this volume, there is a trend elsewhere in case law to uphold the rights of
persons with capacity to engage in sexual conduct. Thus in Re MM, Local Authority
X v MM and KM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam), an incapacity case, MM was able to
consent to sexual activity but lacked capacity to decide with whom she would
associate. She had an ongoing relationship with a man, who had subjected her to
violence in the past and encouraged her to cease her psychiatric medications. At the
time of the case, MM was resident in supported accommodation, from which her
partner had been banned. While the court supported the ban, it also required the local
authority to make arrangements to ensure periodic unsupervised time away from the
supported accommodation, for sexual congress to occur with her partner. In this
context, the court refers to MM’s right to sexual intercourse (para 149), holding
Given the importance rightly attached by the Strasbourg jurisprudence to this
most ‘‘fundamental’’ and ‘‘essential’’ aspect of the private life respect for
which is mandated by Article 8, any public body which proposes to interfere
with the sexual life of someone who, like MM, has capacity faces a heavy
burden. ‘‘Particularly serious reasons’’ must exist. Indeed where the relation-
ship has lasted as long as this one has, especially pressing reasons must surely
be shown to exist. In the present case, in my judgment, they do not. (para 159)
This is a markedly different tone to RH and other hospital cases regarding article 8
rights.
Therapeutics
A number of the policies cite therapeutic concerns in defence of a restrictive policy
towards sexual conduct. Often, this is placed in the context of the frequency of
histories of sexual abuse among service users. The evidence of Dr Diane James in
the RN case provides a good example of this concern:
We already have concerns about physical and emotional reaction by patients
who have been emotionally hurt. I believe that this would be made worse if
sexual relationships were allowed to develop. It is for these reasons that no
sexual activity whatsoever is allowed under the Hospital’s Policy pursuant to
that no condoms are permitted. [para 17]
Another policy warns of the risks of physical contact, both in terms of reliving
the abuse and in terms of creating perpetrators of abuse:
Physical contact may be experienced as sexually exciting. It may be a
repetition of behaviour that in the past was part of an abusive relationship and
there may be excitement, confusion and fear about what will happen next.
* * *
What once was suffered passively in situations of physical or sexual abuse is
repeated actively in order to shift from the intolerable position of helpless
victim to the more powerful one of perpetrator.
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Certainly, the complexities related to past sexual abuse, and the potential
antitherapeutic effects must be acknowledged. When this is the case, sexual or
emotional involvements may sometimes be at best problematic and at worst actively
destructive.
Once again, however, it is fair to ask whether a simply prohibitive policy is
necessarily the right way forward. As noted above, that risks driving the relationship
into secrecy, so that those involved are effectively precluded from talking about the
relationship and its effects on them. It would seem that all the facilities in this study
would view this as a bad thing: all the policies in this study state that counselling or
a similar service regarding relationships should be available to service users. It is
difficult to see how this policy is to be implemented in institutions that are
restrictive of relationships, however: once again, in order to get the service, the
patient needs to identify himself or herself as a potential transgressor of the
relationship policy.
The approach is also problematic, in that most people in forensic facilities will
not remain in total institutions for life. When some form of absolute or conditional
release occurs, the service user will be in a position to form emotional and sexual
relationships. Clearly, for sake of the well-being, and potentially the safety, of the
parties involved in such relationships, some preparation must be offered prior to
release. That is now provided by counselling and similar programmes, including
psychotherapy. It is fair to ask, however, as Heather Ellis Cucolo has argued in a
slightly different context (Cucolo 2007), whether sexual conduct ought to be
prohibited in the facility, particularly in the period in the lead-up to the individual’s
release, at a time when markedly closer observation of the relationship is possible,
and more immediate support or intervention can be provided as required.
Upon release, it is of course highly desirable that the individuals have a secure
social system in the community, typically provided through family relationships.
Once again, the policies that are particularly restrictive on relationships may be
problematic in this context. In Hales’ sample, six people were married or in long-
term relationships at the time of admission to high secure facilities; in no case did
the relationship survive the detention (Hales et al. 2006, 258). Relationships fail for
many reasons, but it is fair to ask whether the deprivations of privacy and intimacy
that flow from intrusive sex and relationship policies may be a relevant factor. If this
is the case, then the policies may well be working against the eventual well-being of
patients in some instances.
As twelve of the fifteen policies note in some form or other, sexuality and
relationships are part of what it is to be human. In the background to the therapeutic
arguments for an intrusive sex and relationship policy is the deeper question of what
is meant by ‘cure’, and whether, if cure is understood in terms of the recovery model
and the ability to live happily in the world, this can sensibly be divorced from
interpersonal relationships, be they sexual or emotional. This is consistent with the
views expressed by service users in Hales’ study:
All patients were able to think of good and bad aspects of a relationship with
someone outside the hospital. Four positive themes emerged: someone from
‘outside’ providing contact with the ‘outside world’ (12 patients); having
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someone ‘stand by them’ (eight patients); the pleasure of a visit or telephone
call (seven patients); and providing practical support (two patients). The three
main negative themes that arose were: the pain of insufficient contact with a
loved one (16 patients); distress caused by breakdown of the relationship (six
patients) and jealousy if the partner did not visit or call (four patients). Four
patients could not see any problems with having a relationship. (Hales et al.
2006, 259)
These views seem sensibly perceptive. Certainly, there will be negative issues
that may attach to relationships when one or both parties are institutionalised; but it
is fair to ask how different those problems will be to relationships outside
institutions, and to ask the corollary question, is it the role of therapeutics to protect
patients from encountering those very human complexities. The fact that all policies
included the provision of education or counselling relating to sexual and emotional
relationships suggests an acknowledgement of this; but the negative or prohibitive
attitudes to sexual or emotional expression in many of the policies suggest a
hesitancy to engage with real situations. In this context, it is worth noting the
hesitancy of courts in other contexts at restricting the rights of competent
individuals to engage in sexual or emotional relationships, even when the
individuals appear extremely vulnerable and where the relationship does seem to
put the individual at risk: see, e.g., Local Authority X v MM and KM [2007] EWHC
2003; Sheffield City Council v E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam); but cf A Local
Authority v Ma [2005] EWHC 2942.
A Patient-Centred Approach?
All of this suggests that appropriate approaches to sexual and emotional
relationships may differ considerably between individual service users. That in
turn suggests the desirability of a patient-centred approach to relationships. This is
entirely consistent with the direction taken by the Royal College reports, which
require not merely formation of an overall policy for institutions, but also that
‘sexuality and sexual issues are considered as part of individual care plans’ (Royal
College of Psychiatrists 1996, p2; 2007, p4). The combined observation suggests
that policies should describe proper approaches to clinical individuation rather than
‘institution related’ general policies.
Certainly, administrative complications may result from such an approach.
It would be likely to mean that some (but not all) service users could enter
relationships with some other (but not any other) service users, leading to what
would be perceived by patients as an inconsistency of privileges on a ward. It might
well be very difficult to explain to service users the basis for those differences,
particularly to service users of marginal capacity flowing from significant learning
disability or dementia, and particularly when confidentiality would preclude
explaining rationales for specific decisions taken about specific individuals. That
said, certainly regarding relationships with visitors to the institution, it is not
obvious that these difficulties would be unmanageable. Even regarding relationships
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between inpatients, considerable hesitancy is appropriate. Basic rights should only
be curtailed for administrative reasons when those reasons really are compelling.
This is not merely an ethical point, but also a legal one. It is clear that curtailment
of sexual activity or the right to form relationships with people engages article 8(1)
of the ECHR: Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97 at 29; Re MM; Local
Authority X v MM and KM [2007] EWHC 2003, 100–106. Such a practice can only
be sustained, therefore, if it is justified under article 8(2). This will be the case only
if the practice is ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic
society’ in the interests of stated factors, most relevant for current purposes being
the prevention of disorder or crime, health, and the protection of rights and freedoms
of others. Potential difficulties of institutional policies being ‘in accordance with the
law’ where noted above. In terms of the substantive factors, a policy will be upheld
only if (1) the objective was sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental
right, (2) the measures designed to meet the objective were rationally connected to
it; and (3) the means used to impair the right or freedom were no more than was
necessary to accomplish the objective: R (N) v Secretary of State for Health [2009]
EWCA Civ 795 at 67. Whether this test is met will no doubt depend on the
circumstances of individual hospitals, or even individual hospital wards. In R (RH) v
Ashworth Hospital Authority [2001] EWHC Admin 872, it was held that Ashworth’s
policy refusing the distribution of condoms was defensible under article 8(2), a
finding that makes no sense unless the hospital’s no sex policy was also so
defensible. As noted above, aspects of that case are problematic, however. While it
may well be that restrictive policies can be defended under article 8(2), the
precedential value of RH should be approached with some care. Its precedential
value further decreases for institutions that do not resemble Ashworth, such as those
outside the high secure sector.
To date, the European Court of Human Rights has itself declined to require
conjugal visits in prisons: Aliev v. Ukraine, No. 41220/98, judgment of 29 July
2003, para 188. It does not appear to have decided on relationships between
individuals in institutions, nor about the right to pursue emotional as distinct from
sexual relationships. It further has not addressed the issue of conjugal visits in a
psychiatric context. How far Aliev applies in this context is an open question. The
Court holds that ‘it is an essential part of a prisoner’s right to respect for family life
that prison authorities assist in maintaining effective contact with his or her close
family members’, but also that ‘some measure of control of prisoners’ contacts with
the outside world is called for and is not of itself incompatible with the convention.’
(para 187) It is not clear, however, whether this final statement flows from the
complexities of managing difficult individuals (which might apply to at least some
forensic psychiatric facilities), or from the punitive nature of prisons (which would
not be the case for psychiatric facilities).
Restrictive policies may thus be defensible under article 8(2) for some
institutions, but particularly outside the high secure sector, the case would need
to be made out with considerable care. If a policy of blanket prohibition does not
meet this standard, however, an individualised, patient-centred approach will
effectively be required as a matter of law.
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A more flexible policy does not necessarily preclude judicial review. In R
(Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1545, the
applicant did not challenge an overall policy (in this case, the statutory regime
regarding the imposition of involuntary psychiatric treatment) as contrary to the
ECHR, but alleged that the question of whether the implementation of the policy in
his case violated the ECHR. The court held that this was, indeed, judicially
reviewable. The case has had a somewhat chequered history, with some courts
attempting to minimise its effect, but the logic appears solid: if a credible case can
be made out that an ECHR right is being violated, some court must be able to
determine whether such a violation is actually taking place and to provide an
appropriate remedy.
If this is the case, then service users would be able to challenge decisions made
restricting their rights to engage in sexual and emotional relationships. In that event,
an individualised approach will effectively become necessary, as an institution
would have to be in a position to explain why it had reached the correct decision
regarding an individual service user.
Winds of Change?
This is not an article that purports to present solutions, but rather to identify tensions
in the status quo, and to bring to light a dimension of sexual citizenship that is often
neglected. It is meant to begin a discussion, rather than to end one.
The discussion arises at a time when pressures are circling. The revision of the
Royal College report (Royal College of Psychiatrists 2007) suggests that from a
therapeutic perspective, the issue is not going to go away. While the approach of the
courts in England and Wales has been deferential to psychiatric hospitals in any
challenges to their policies, they have been much more supportive of sexual and
relationship rights outside the high secure setting, and particularly for people with
mental health problems in the community. At some point, these diverse strands of
case law must collide.
The ECHR position similarly cannot be considered static. While the Strasbourg
court has so far declined to require the provision of conjugal visits by partners, it has
certainly left the possibility open that its position may change, as in the following
comment from Aliev v. Ukraine (No. 41220/98, judgment of 29 July 2003):
Whilst noting with approval the reform movement in several European
countries to improve prison conditions by facilitating conjugal visits, the Court
considers that the refusal of such visits may for the present time be regarded as
justified for the prevention of disorder and crime within the meaning of the
second paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention…. [para 188]
As noted above, Aliev is a case about prisons, but a finding that conjugal visits were
required in a prison context would bring considerable and fairly immediate pressure
to bear on psychiatric institutions to reconsider their policies, and to develop much
more robust defences of them than appear to be in place now. It would, it is
submitted, be wise to begin that discussion before a Strasbourg axe falls.
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